Opinion

“Stop the boats” is still printed across podiums, hashtags and news banners in Britain, a mantra that has defined years of right-wing campaigning. But while Conservative and Reform UK MPs fight to stage photo-ops beside inflatable dinghies for the evening news, a very real — and 

 — threat to sovereignty comes not from people seeking refuge, but from armies of fake accounts. Armies of social-media bots — synthetic, tireless and globally networked — have been pouring into the nation’s online spaces, churning out divisive content, mimicking voters, and quietly shaping the national mood.

The refugees crossing the Channel are real people; the crisis shaking Britain’s democracy has been engineered.

The UK is one of the few democracies that has built a legal and institutional machine to counter this threat. The 

 gives Ofcom sweeping powers to force social-media companies to remove illegal or harmful material, including 

 and coordinated inauthentic behaviour. The Act also created a new 

 making it a crime to send deliberately false messages intended to cause serious harm. Under the 

 — such as spreading false information to sway an election — is now a specific criminal offence.

These frameworks were partly shaped by years of digital manipulation that often benefited the far right. Researchers and parliamentary committees have documented how automated networks pushed anti-migrant and anti-Muslim narratives during the Brexit referendum, the pandemic, and even in the build-up to the 2024 summer riots. Following the 

, an event that horrified the country, far-right influencers and bot accounts spread false claims about the suspect’s identity. The lies moved faster than official statements could correct them, turning collective grief into targeted rage and helping to incite days of violence against mosques and asylum centres across several towns. Much of what looked like spontaneous anger online — the slogans, memes and “grassroots” fury — was in fact amplified by hundreds of fake accounts working in unison.

Was the online anger after the Southport murders really driven by bots?

The far right has learned how to industrialise emotion. Automation tools now post, reply, and reshare at inhuman speed, creating the illusion of consensus. Algorithms reward anger and fear, pushing divisive content into millions of feeds. The result is an ecosystem where prejudice feels popular and moderation feels marginal. As one parliamentary report warned this year, “Failures to properly tackle online disinformation risk further public disorder.”

Government action has expanded beyond legislation. Within the 

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

National Security Online Information Team (NSOIT)

 now monitors disinformation trends and flags bot networks targeting UK audiences. During the pandemic and the war in Ukraine, this unit — and its partner, the 

worked to expose Kremlin propaganda and coordinate takedowns with major platforms

. Britain has even sanctioned figures behind the Internet Research Agency, the notorious Russian troll farm once run by Yevgeny Prigozhin.

These moves signal that the UK sees information warfare as a security issue, not just a communications problem. But the state’s machinery is still slower than the technology it seeks to control. Botnets evolve faster than regulators draft codes of practice. AI systems now generate text and imagery indistinguishable from human content; fake profiles come complete with family photos, slang, and “personal” anecdotes. By the time Ofcom can verify a violation, the post may already have reached millions.

Platforms, for their part, face legal pressure but uneven incentives. Under the Online Safety Act, major “Category 1” services must enforce their own rules against bots and fake accounts — failure to do so could bring fines of 

. Yet some firms appear reluctant to sacrifice engagement for authenticity. When X (formerly Twitter) loosened its moderation policies after ownership changes, researchers recorded a sharp resurgence of bot-driven hate speech and conspiracies. Regulation without compliance, experts note, is little more than paperwork.

The government’s election safeguards are improving but still incomplete. Since 

every online campaign ad or post must carry a “digital imprint” showing who paid for or published itlectoral Reform Society guide

. That transparency measure helps trace financial influence but not the truthfulness of the message itself. Deepfake videos and synthetic audio clips — some depicting politicians saying things they never said — are spreading faster than fact-checkers can respond. The previous government claimed existing offences already covered malicious deepfakes (

), but the current administration has since acknowledged the gap and pledged to review the law. Ministers have promised new legislation on synthetic media, but the focus so far is on individual harms rather than the mass deployment of bots that spread political disinformation.

Still, even as the legislative net tightens, the social damage of years of unrestrained misinformation lingers. Automated propaganda has blurred the line between public sentiment and algorithmic theatre. It has amplified fringe views until they sound mainstream, nudging political parties to chase synthetic trends. When far-right talking points dominate trending lists or comment sections, the effect is circular: the media covers the outrage, politicians echo it, and the bots that seeded it declare victory.

For ordinary users, this erosion of authenticity breeds cynicism. People begin to doubt not only what they read but the possibility of truth itself. As one academic at the Alan Turing Institute put it in written evidence to Parliament, only a tiny fraction of Britons use fact-checking tools or authenticity plug-ins — “millions share unverified memes every day, while only thousands verify them.” The government has responded with a 

 to fund training in schools and communities, 

recently increasing investment by £2 million

. But take-up remains limited, and experts warn that without broad public awareness, even the best regulation functions like flood defences no one closes.

The challenge is compounded by how social-media algorithms reward extremity. A 

Commons committee report on “Social Media, Misinformation and Harmful Algorithms”

  urged the creation of a code of practice for advertising systems that monetise false or harmful content. The government has so far declined to legislate, preferring industry self-regulation through its “Online Advertising Programme.” Yet the committee’s warning was stark: when rage and conspiracy generate revenue, truth will always struggle to compete.

Technological fixes are emerging. One idea gaining traction is 

  — requiring automated accounts to identify themselves, mirroring legislation in California and proposals in the US Congress. Others advocate for verified-identity tiers, allowing users to filter out unverified or anonymous accounts altogether. The 

 already compels platforms to offer opt-in identity verification tools so adults can limit interaction with unverified profiles. Ofcom is expected to explore stronger versions of these systems in its upcoming codes of practice.

. Experts want Ofcom to use its new powers to require platforms to disclose how recommendation engines amplify false or extreme material, and to impose “circuit-breakers” when viral content appears suspicious. The goal isn’t censorship but accountability — ensuring that virality doesn’t outpace verification. The government has resisted creating a new “Misinformation Monitor,” 

arguing that Ofcom already has the mandate

, but the idea of a dedicated oversight body may resurface if Ofcom’s enforcement proves too slow.

International collaboration is also vital. Britain is working with allies through the 

 to share intelligence on foreign influence operations and has supported UN efforts to develop 

Global Principles for Information Integrity

. Some analysts want systematic disinformation itself recognised as a sanctionable offence in UK law — just as the EU has done. Such measures would let the government target overseas actors who wage information warfare while hiding behind jurisdictional borders.

Yet beyond all the legislation and diplomacy lies a cultural question: what kind of public sphere does Britain want? Far-right movements have thrived on a mixture of grievance, spectacle and algorithmic assistance. Each time bots flood a conversation about refugees or crime, the Overton window shifts slightly, making cruelty sound like common sense. To counter that drift, transparency and education may matter more than punitive bans.

The government could go further by launching annual “information integrity reports” to Parliament — a proposal MPs debated this year but ministers rejected 

. Regular public audits would at least keep the issue visible and pressure both platforms and regulators to act. Civil-society groups such as Full Fact have called for 

greater support and possibly a formal role in real-time flagging of viral falsehoods

If there is a lesson from recent years, it’s that truth cannot defend itself automatically. Britain’s defences — legal, technological, civic — are all necessary but none sufficient. Bot networks exploit the cracks between them: the delay between detection and takedown, the gap between outrage and understanding. Stopping them will require persistence, transparency and cooperation across borders and sectors.

For all the talk of sovereignty, it is worth remembering that the bots respect none. They cross digital frontiers faster than policy can be drafted, shaping national conversation in ways that would have horrified the architects of parliamentary democracy. To stop them is not to silence dissent but to safeguard authenticity — to ensure that when we argue, we are at least arguing with one another, not with scripts written in someone else’s bunker.

So whilst Britain’s far-right MPs and agitators chant “Stop the boats”, the rest of the country might prefer to stop the bots — and, in doing so, undercut the cynical politics that feed on both fear and falsehood.

Stop the BOTS

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